The New Science of the Mind by Mark Rowlands

Author:Mark Rowlands [Rowlands, Mark]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Published: 2011-07-03T07:31:00+00:00

Condition (4)

As we shall see, perhaps the most difficult implication of taking the thesis of the amalgamated mind seriously lies in understanding the sense in which cognitive processes belong to cognizing subjects or organisms. I am going to argue that cognitive processes can belong to a subject in two different ways, one pertaining to the personal level, the other to the subpersonal level. The personal level, I shall argue, is primary. Cognitive processes occurring at the subpersonal level belong to the subject to the extent that they make an appropriate contribution to cognitive states and processes occurring at the personal level. This idea is straightforward, but surprisingly difficult to render precise. I shall attempt to do so in terms of the concept of integration: subpersonal cognitive processes belong to the subject to the extent that they are appropriately integrated into the personal-level states and processes possessed by a representational subject. The key, then, is to provide an account of how a personal-level cognitive process can belong to a representational subject. This is the task of the second half of the book.

I am going to motivate and defend conditions (1)-(3) separately from condition (4). Conditions (1)-(3), I shall argue, can be extracted from examination of various standard models of cognitive-scientific practice. Condition (4) is also implicit in this practice, but the bulk of its defense will be based on more general grounds of plausibility. Defense of (4) will be postponed until the next chapter.

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